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ABSTRACT 
 
The focus of this paper is the architecture of complex forms of governance, specifically, the 
architecture of networks. A network is a complex form of organization designed to govern 
inter-firm transactions involving horizontal and vertical coordination. The agent´s choice 
among various institutional arrangements is affected by relation-specific investments, 
distributive mechanisms, and dynamic aspects based on relational contractual mechanisms, 
trust being a relevant variable. This paper investigates how horizontal and vertical 
coordination levels are connected. It recognizes that price incentives are important and 
introduces the effect of network externalities that also offer incentives. The paper presents a 
semiformal model that considers the existence of network externalities and applies a game 
approach to explain the choice among alternative strategies. The conceptual model is applied 
to two cases of network architecture in agro-industrial relations. 
 
Keywords: Network governance, agro-industrial networks. 
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DINÂMICA DE GOVERNANÇA DE REDES: UMA CONTRIBUIÇÃO PARA O 
ESTUDO DE FORMAS COMPLEXAS 
 
RESUMO 
 
O foco deste artigo é a arquitetura de formas complexas de governança, especificamente, a 
arquitetura de redes. Uma rede é uma forma complexa de organização desenhada para 
governar transações inter-firmas envolvendo coordenação horizontal e vertical. A escolha do 
agente entre vários arranjos institucionais é afetada por investimentos específicos, 
mecanismos distributivos e aspectos dinâmicos baseados em mecanismos contratuais 
relacionais, sendo a confiança uma variável relevante. Este artigo investiga como os níveis 
horizontal e vertical de coordenação são conectados. Reconhece-se que os incentivos de 
preços são importantes, e introduz-se o efeito de externalidades de rede que também oferecem 
incentivos. O artigo apresenta um modelo semi-formalizado que considera a existência de 
externalidades de rede e aplica uma abordagem de jogo para explicar a escolha entre 
estratégias alternativas. O modelo conceitual é aplicado a dois casos de arquitetura de redes 
nas relações agroindustriais. 
 
Palavras-Chave: Governança de rede, redes agroindustriais. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The literature on network governance underexplores the choice among feasible 
alternative arrangements within this governance model. No clear-cut definition exists for the 
concept of network or the related strategic choices involving allocation of decision rights 
among many agents. Descriptive ad hoc approaches of complex inter-firm relations 
predominate, while existing theories explaining hybrid organizations remain underutilized. 
Renaming old concepts and jargon seems to be the rule in the literature, rather than applying 
existing theories of the firm to explain network arrangements. Theorists applied little effort to 
explain the logic of network governance, and the same applies to empirical studies. In order to 
motivate the use of existing concepts, this paper proposes an explanation of network 
governance based on existing complementarities between transaction cost economics and 
incomplete contract theory, demonstrating strategic choices among complex institutional 
arrangements1.  
This study focuses on the strategic choice of coordination devices with the aim of 
augmenting the value of production, and is based on the cooperation of independent agents in 
                                                 
1
 From now on, ICT and TCE will be used to replace Incomplete Contract Theory and Transaction Cost 
Economics, respectively. 
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the presence of transaction-specific investments. From a TCE perspective, the study employs 
the logic of efficient governance applied to vertical relations, considering bounded rationality 
and opportunism, both of which cause ex-post contractual hazards. From an ICT perspective, 
the study utilizes concepts based on the allocation of decision rights affecting the choices 
made among alternative contractual arrangements, based on the relations between TCE and 
ICT as discussed in Brousseau and Fares (2000). 
This paper’s key contribution relates to the connection between the horizontal and 
vertical coordination tools derived from the existence of co-specialized assets and network 
externalities. By connection, we mean the allocation of decision rights and the different 
governance structures observed at different levels of coordination. 
In order to implement joint strategies, network strategists need to devise mechanisms 
to control ex-post hazards. Inter-firm governance mechanisms enable the coordination of 
strategic decisions such as definition of product quality and quantity, timing of delivery and 
brand specification, all of which result from cooperation among independent agents operating 
at different levels of the network, being the agents subject to the possibility of contractual 
hazards. 
The resource-based perspective recognizes that dynamic aspects, like routines of a 
specific nature, might evolve over time, and that relational contracts affect the provision of 
institutional protection for ex-post hazards. The institutional environment is assumed to be 
exogenously determined. 
This study is built on several previous contributions, particularly from Brousseau and 
Fares (2000), as well as Lazzarini, Chaddad and Cook (2001) who pose the concept of net-
chain, and Sauvée (2001), who discusses networks as governance forms and distinguishes two 
institutional arrangements. This paper proposes a TCE-based explanation for the different 
features of network governance, in which vertical and horizontal coordination are 
simultaneously present and where relational aspects develop among agents. In addition, this 
paper proposes an explanation of possible network arrangements in terms of their institutional 
architecture, opening room for empirical tests. 
The study is organized as follows: Following this introduction, the second part 
discusses the concept of network governance. The third explores the contribution of existing 
theories of the firm to the study of networks and hybrid organizations. The fourth section 
introduces a model for handling simultaneous vertical and horizontal coordination in the 
presence of co-specialized assets and network externalities. Part five presents evidence from 
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cases based on this model in order to discuss the efficient choice of alternative network 
arrangements, and part six presents conclusive remarks.  
 
2. About Networks 
What are networks, and why do they emerge? In what dimensions do they differ from 
production chains? The term is applied with different meanings, usually relating to continuous 
relational contracts involving more than one agent. Menard (2002) defined network as “all 
arrangements defining a set of recurrent contractual ties among autonomous firms.” Diederen 
and Jonkers (2001) consider that “a basic assumption of network relationships is that one 
party is dependent on the resources controlled by another and that there are gains to be had by 
the pooling of resources.” The authors add, “The network is characterized by the specific 
properties of the transaction relationships, typified by relational relationships in which formal 
and informal sharing and trust building mechanisms are crucial.” Omta, Trienekens and Beers 
(2001) suggest an alternative definition of network as “the total of actors within one industry 
and/or between related industries, which can potentially work together to add value to 
customers.” Lazzarini, Chaddad and Cook (2001), in shaping the concept of net-chain, 
distinguish network analysis from supply-chain analysis, proposing that “network analysis 
provides numerous tools to map the structure of inter-organizational relationships or ties 
based on the recognition that network structure contains and at the same time is shaped by 
firms’ actions.”  
Sauvée (2001) describes the literature of networks and suggests that this arrangement 
can be seen as a combination of governance structures, with multilevel relationships between 
horizontally or vertically related entities. 
Claro (2004, p.37) defines network as “the set of connected business relationships of 
an organization that can be separated in sub-groups and form essential sources of valuable 
information that offers benefits to buyer-supplier relationships in terms of internal processes, 
trade conditions and foreseeing actions of counterpart.” 
The definitions point in more or less the same direction. Most are not precise about the 
application of the concept and fail to discuss its nature. The reason why networks emerge 
remains an open question. Part of the literature is directed to the application as can be seen in 
innovation networks (PYKA, 2002) or to agri-food networks (SAUVÉE, 2001). We maintain 
that a theory of network governance must be further developed in order to allow empirical 
analysis. Basically, three recurring elements in the literature hold promise for empirical work. 
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The first is the governance mechanism focusing efficiency based on transaction cost rationale; 
the second, the allocation of decision rights (authority); and the third, the presence of trust and 
social embeddedness as treated by Granovetter (1985). 
 
2.1 Distinctive Characteristics 
This paper is based on the following basic principles: First, networks are defined as 
complex and multifirm institutional arrangements designed to coordinate transactions in order 
to create and capture value; therefore, we have elected the rationale of efficient governance 
choices. Second, interconnected vertical and horizontal coordination of transactions are in 
place. Third, complex hybrid governance forms involving multiple agents and multiple 
periods will be considered. Fourth, relational aspects, the role of trust and informal rules are 
potentially relevant given that reciprocal dependence and relational contracts are present. 
Fifth, this study will define strategies jointly, based on expected mutual gains, and design 
dispute-solving mechanisms. Agents keep their identity and define strategies ex-ante, with 
some degree of cooperation sharing ex-post decision rights in different levels. 
 
3. Relevant Theories of the Firm 
This section explores relevant elements of TCE and ICT. Both theories search for 
explanations of the same phenomenon, namely the governance of vertical transactions. The 
first explanation emerges from the perspective of bounded rationality, leading to the 
impossibility to draft complete contracts and raising the potential for ex-post hazards. With 
the presence of transaction costs and potential opportunistic behavior, the institutional 
arrangement is designed with the transaction-cost rationale in mind as the explanation for the 
alignment between transactional characteristics and the governance mechanism 
(WILLIAMSON, 1975, 1985). Critics of TCE, such as Granovetter, point to the theory’s 
limited ability to embrace simultaneous complex transactions, as well as its lack of emphasis 
on social ties. Williamson (1993) reacts to Granovetter’s criticisms by saying that network 
analysis is not beyond the reach of transaction cost economics and that the theory embraces 
the embeddedness argument. 
The ICT model calls attention to the impossibility of designing complete contracts. 
Costly contracts result from the need to allocate two types of rights: specific and residual 
rights. The theory suggests that optimal ownership results from allocating both specific and 
residual rights in such a way that parties maximize the value of investments (GROSSMAN; 
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HART, 1986; HART, 1995). Grossman and Hart (1986) point to the missing issue in TCE by 
stating that: “the TCE argument for integration does not explain how the scope for such 
(opportunistic) behavior changes when one of the self-interested owners become equally self-
interested employee of the other owner.” The same authors also criticize the lack of clear 
definition of integration, focusing on the decision to integrate vertically in terms of ownership 
of assets. Therefore, they say, the definition of firm emerges: “a firm consists of those assets 
that it owns or over which it has control.” 
The debate between these approaches is still inconclusive. ICT cannot be seen just as a 
formalization of TCE, since the theories differ in assumptions as well as scope and 
application. Both are based on the same consideration of contract incompleteness, but each 
treats this consideration distinctly. For ICT, it is not possible to contract ex-ante because some 
attributes are observable but not perfectly verifiable. The ICT model embraces both vertical 
and horizontal coordination, while TCE places its focus on vertical coordination. As stated by 
Hart (1995), these approaches are closely related, but ICT puts more emphasis on power in 
the form of decision rights allocation. Second, as stated by Brousseau and Fares (2000), the 
differences are tangible in terms of assumptions about the causes of contractual 
incompleteness. We add to these noted distinctions that TCE focuses on vertical coordination, 
whereas ICT considers lateral integration as well, as stated by Grossman and Hart (1986, 
p.695). 
The dynamic capabilities perspective (DCP), as posed by Teece, Pisano and Shuen 
(1997), also contributes to an explanation of network arrangements. The authors say, 
“Whereas the resources approach sees rents as originating from difficulty to imitate specific 
resources, the DCP inquires how resources are transformed into firm-specific capabilities.” 
Basically, this study uses the concept of organizational capabilities as a source of rents, where 
learning and complementary assets are added to transaction-cost-saving incentives. 
 
4. A Model of Network Governance 
The present study explores the interface of the capabilities approaches ICT and TCE. 
The model is inspired by the literature of Incomplete Contract Theory, which is limited to 
deal with network governance, due to the treatment given to both ex-post contractual 
flexibility and the dynamic aspects present in observed networks as learning and trust. As 
proposed by Gibbons (2002) “. . . one still hears mistaken views over what different theories 
actually say .  .  .  mistaken views as Grossman and Hart (1986) formalized Williamson 
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(1986), in spite of the clear expositions by Whinston and others of the important differences 
between these theories.” As posed by Brousseau and Fares (2000), the transaction-cost 
approach deals with the contrast between alternative institutional arrangements or, as 
Williamson calls it, discrete institutional analysis, but the theory does not perform well in 
dealing with individual contract design. The same author also considers the inability of ICT to 
deal with multiple institutional arrangements. On the other hand, we add that ICT leaves no 
room for relational aspects to evolve, and so it does not allow for the relaxation of the 
assumption of verifiability.2 Even if reputation elements cannot eliminate all problems of 
opportunism, certainly reputation counts in some measure as a relevant governance 
mechanism. Nevertheless, we maintain in this paper that the formalization effort presented in 
the ICT-based literature can inspire TCE-based studies. 
 
4.1 Governance Decision at M1 
A protoformalized model is developed in this chapter to capture the complex 
governance mechanisms found in networks. The model is not general in the sense that it 
considers the case of specific networks designed as a set of firms operating upstream (M2), 
which supply a single firm downstream in a production chain. We assume that the final 
product has quality characteristics that demand both horizontal and vertical coordination be 
produced, maintained and delivered. The production of quantity and quality attributes at M2 
depends on the design of the collective arrangement, and we assume the presence of sub-
activity in costs. The quality and quantity levels of production (Q) are verifiable and 
observable at both production stages and can be affected by firms M1 (downstream) and M2 
(upstream). Upstream firms at M2 choose the governance structure, reduced in this model to 
whether or not to define a horizontal level of decision where the collective strategy is defined 
(figure 1). 
                                                 
2
 Hart (1995, p. 67) states that […to develop a theory of the firm, , one must analyze a situation where the first-
best cannot be guaranteed, i.e. where reputation forces are not strong enough to eliminate all problems of 
opportunism]. 
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Figure 1 – Choices of Network Design 
 
There are n firms operating at M2, which might make specific investments for 
horizontal coordination or otherwise they negotiate on an individual basis with the firm 
downstream, that being the strategic choice. If firms at M2 decide for the collective horizontal 
arrangement, it will involve positive governance costs added to transaction-specific 
investments. Negotiations will take place to define rights over the income flow generated 
through sales of the production at M1, giving rise to potential holdup at M1. Therefore, this 
model emerges as a governance choice based on efficiency criteria, considering transaction-
cost-economizing incentives, where the network companies make investment decisions to 
produce quality and quantity aligned with distinct levels of transaction-specific investments.  
As a result, the institutional arrangement should be structured to protect agents from 
ex-post hazards and quasi-rent expropriation.3 The model allows for the definition of a 
                                                 
3
 We prefer not to call it a rent-seeking model as suggested by Gibbons (2002), in order to avoid confusion with 
the traditional use of this jargon, as worked in Krueger (1979). 
M1 
M2 
M1 
M2 
Model 1
 
Model 2
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complex hybrid governance form that simultaneously defines horizontal and vertical 
coordination mechanisms in the presence of specific investments. 
The decision problem, as stated, represents the typical agriculture–industry relation, 
given the characteristic of many agents being geographically dispersed, as well as the market 
structure of the agriculture-production and food-processing industries.  
Consider a production network characterized by two groups of firms, M1 and M2, 
where M2 is a set of n homogeneous and independent firms supplying M1 with an amount Q2 
(equation 1) of an intermediary good. M1 has no alternative option of suppliers but is willing 
to pay different rewards based on the high or low quality of Q2. Since quality is subject to 
variation, contracts are incomplete, and it is not possible to define ex-ante the reward level; 
therefore, P2 will be defined after production of Q1 takes place. 
  
M2 = Q2  and, (1) 
 
M1 = Q1 (2) 
 
Firms have some effect on the quality level of Q2, H or L, and define collectively the 
horizontal coordination devices used to produce proportions of good/high quality, providing 
control mechanisms and penalties for underperformance or opportunistic behavior. The 
governance mechanism requires a level of specific investment at M2 defined as i(.), where 
i(H) > i(L). The managerial governance cost to produce Q2(H) is defined as GC(H)4. The 
level of transaction-specific investments at M1 is given by e(H) and e(L). Therefore, 
 
Q1 = Q1H + Q1L and, 
(3) 
 
Q2 = Q2H + Q2L (4) 
 
Production costs at M2 are C2 and present sub-additivity. The implication is that the 
sum of individual production costs is larger than the horizontally coordinated production 
costs, as expressed in equation (5). Sub-additivity is introduced to capture eventual network 
externalities.  
                                                 
4
 We assume that C(H) is the same for M1 and M2. 
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C2 (Q2) < ∑
=
n
i
iC
1
2  
(5) 
 
The payoff of M2 takes two different levels as a function of the quality supplied, P2(H) 
> P2(L) being defined ex-post.5 The model considers n periods in such a way that reputation 
mechanisms can evolve on both horizontal and vertical levels. The payoff level P2(L) can be 
obtained by direct trade without specific investments (i) with low managerial costs being the 
payoff for the strategy of commodity production. 
All firms make specific investments at t0. Production and trade are made at t1. As 
opposed to the ICT model, here we consider that an incomplete, long-term contract be 
drafted; however, ex-post hazards might take place, affecting both the total revenue and the 
share to be directed to each firm. 
M1 chooses the level of specific investment defined as e, where e(H) > e(L) if the 
downstream firm keeps up its efforts to maintain quality. The product-quality level for the 
consumer results from independent efforts at both levels of the production chain. M1’s net 
payoff is P1(H) or P1(L) for both cases, and the agents under contract share the surplus, 
provided that quality is observable and verifiable, and that reputation mechanisms are in 
place. 
Considering both production and governance costs at M2 in the presence of network 
externalities and positive governance costs, we have:  
 
GC + C2 (Q2) < ∑
=
n
i
iC
1
2  
(6) 
 
The decision to implement a horizontal institutional arrangement aligned to the 
production of high quality depends on the contrast between the positive governance costs 
added to the production costs affected by network externalities, with the alternative 
institutional arrangement that has no governance costs and captures no network externalities.  
The definition of the institutional design at M2 depends on payoffs of either high or 
low quality. The payoff functions for high and low quality are: 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Contracts with ex-post price definition are common in agro-industrial supply relations. 
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R1H = P2H . Q2H – i (H) – GC – C2 (Q2H), and (7) 
R2L = P2L . Q2L – C2 (Q2L),6 where C2 (Q2L)= ∑
=
n
i
iC
1
2  
(8) 
 
In the presence of sub-additivity C2 (Q2H) < C2 (Q2L). 
M1 chooses high-quality institutional arrangement if (7) > (8), or: 
P2H Q2H – i(H) – GC – PCH > P2L . Q2L – PCL, where PCH = C2 (Q2H) and PCL = C2 (Q2L) 
Assuming that low- and high-quality production levels are identical, and rewriting the 
inequality, we have: 
 
(P2H - P2L) + (PCL - PCH) > [GC(H) + i(H)] / Q2 (9) 
 
On the left side, the first term represents the price premium received for the high-
quality product. The second term captures the effect of sub-additivity and represents a 
premium due to the potential cost reduction associated with the horizontal coordination. The 
right-hand side represents the average cost to produce high quality, which includes 
governance costs and transaction-specific investments. 
Equation (9) is useful in understanding the decision of agents at M1 from a typical 
comparative-institutional perspective. It also says that in the presence of strong network 
externalities, even with no price premium, the agents at M1 might choose the institutional 
arrangement of high quality. This model explains the existence of production networks in 
which no price premiums are observed at level M2.7 
 
4.2 Role of Co-Specialized Assets 
Relational aspects are relevant in network analysis. The value of specific investments 
might be affected by dynamic effects that originate in the generation of joint knowledge of 
agents at M1 and M2. Co-specialized assets might appear, and quasi-rents can emerge from the 
interaction and dependence of specialized independent agents. 
In order to capture the dynamic aspects, consider a game wherein M1 has a choice of e 
(level of transaction specific investment) and M2 agents have a choice of i. The payoff matrix 
                                                 
6
 For simplicity we are assuming that only high or low quality polar choices are made. Different proportions of 
high and low quality can be incorporated in the model. 
7
 Organic food and genetic modified free grains are good examples. 
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represents different outcomes, provided that M1 and M2 make simultaneous and independent 
decisions. 
 
Framework 1 — Specific-Ivestment-Decision-Payoff Matrix 
 
If neither makes specific investments, only normal commodity profits are realized. If 
M2 makes no specific investments, M1 has no supply of good-quality inputs (from bad grapes, 
no good wine can be produced). If M2 produces high quality but M1 does not, since prices are 
defined ex-post and no premium will be placed on the product, M2 will suffer a loss (the sum 
of governance costs and specific investments). The game presents a Nash solution of high 
quality without dominant strategy. 
The solution is sensible to the introduction of opportunistic appropriation of quasi-
rents. Specific investments and governance costs are kept at M2, where this decision is 
dependent on the past behavior of M1. So, 
it = 0  if  Dt-1 < D* 
it >0   if Dt-1 > D* 
D = (P2H - P2L) (10) 
 
Take the decision tree represented in figure 2. Consider that both M1 and M2 can break 
the agreement. Define D as being the price premium, which M1 defines ex-post.  
 
 
Figure 2 — Price Premium and Investments Decision Tree 
Dt 
D < D* 
D > D* 
M2 
M1 i > 0 (0, -i) 
i = B (0, 0) 
i > 0 (R1H, R2H) 
i = 0 (-e, R2H) 
L 
L H 
H 
(0,0) (0, - (i + GC)) 
(0,0) (R2H, R1H) 
M2 
M1 
i 
e 
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If M1 pays a low premium at t0, then agents at M2 make no investments at t1, since it 
will lead to negative payoff. If M1 pays a positive premium, M2 require two decisions, one 
being to match with specific positive investments, making possible a positive payoff for both 
(R1H, R2H). But it is possible that M2 cheats at t1, capturing the quasi-rents R2H+i, leaving M1 
with a loss of e. If we consider an infinite horizon, reputation effects will preclude this 
solution on a collective basis, but each participant at M1 has incentives to cheat, so the 
horizontal coordination must be designed to monitor and exclude this behavior.  
Dynamic effects might appear if specific joint investments show complementarities. 
This effect can be captured by the reduction in governance costs over time, as in  
 
GCt = f (i(H), e (H) where, 
t
GC
∂
∂
< 0  
(11) 
 
If governance costs are reduced over time by learning and routines, the importance of 
price premium might be reduced.  
 
5. Empirical Evidence 
Two case studies focused on network arrangements are here examined through the 
proposed  model, namely IllyCafè, an Italian coffee roasting company, and Horta & Arte, an 
organic producer of vegetables in Brazil. IllyCafè is located in Trieste, Italy. Two versions of 
the IllyCafè case have been developed, the first by Zylbersztajn and Neves (1997) and the 
second by Neves, Saes and Rezende (2002). Both studies presented IllyCafè as a network 
operating in many countries, coordinated by the industry and coordinating a large number of 
specialized coffee farmers who supply high-quality coffee grain. IllyCafè represents a case in 
which farmers have no horizontal governance structure to coordinate activities at M2, each 
farmer acting individually. About 50% of the procurement of high-quality coffee grains to 
supply the industry is made in Brazil. The company offers price premiums and annual awards 
to incentivize top-level coffee growers to make specific investments to upgrade the caliber of 
high-quality coffee. The award carries a high reputation to the winner, with expected effects 
in the market exceeding the specific transaction with Illy. Each coffee grower trades 
independently with the industry in Italy (M1). The institutional arrangement is provided by 
Illy, which monitors the quality level of the supplies. Therefore, no governance costs are 
allocated by farmers at M2. In alignment with the model, the award and the price premium are 
14 
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the incentive mechanisms. Only yearly short-term contracts are in place. If Illy breaks 
promises, paying no premium, no farmers will be motivated to make investments, and 
therefore reputation effects are set in place. Farmers must maintain their efforts in order to 
reach the quality level that allows them to have a new transaction in place. The industry bears 
internal governance costs represented by the structure, in order to control quality attributes, 
and exclusion for subperformance occurs simply through the decision of buyers not to buy 
coffee from a specific farmer. 
One observes no evidence of network externalities, no evidence of horizontal 
organization of farmers, and total allocation of decision rights within the industry. Farmers 
make specific investments in order to upgrade their product quality, and the industry makes 
specific investments to keep and upgrade quality.     
A second case, one involving organic production in Brazil, is based on two studies by 
Farina et al. (2002) and Rezende (2003). Both studies focus on fresh vegetables, which raise 
coordination problems due to high time-specificity. In Brazil, organic agriculture is still 
restricted to regional niches, but in recent years it has attracted the interest of major 
supermarket chains, most notably in São Paulo. A price premium has motivated new farmers 
to adopt organic-production technology. As a result of the supply growth, price premium has 
quickly vanished. Surprisingly, supply has continued to grow, despite higher production and 
certification costs and lower price premiums. This is exactly the situation addressed by the 
model adopted in this paper, since farmers have made investments in horizontal coordination 
mechanisms in the presence of network externalities.  
Based on production practices that dispense agrochemicals and highly soluble 
fertilizers, organic agriculture aims to produce contamination-free food. Most organic farmers 
operate on a small scale in Brazil. The product is generally sold and/or processed by farmer 
associations to explore scale and scope economies, as well as to cope with network 
externalities at M2. Horizontal coordination of farmers involves high transaction costs, in the 
presence of horizontal interdependencies and incentives encouraging free-rider behavior. One 
example of a farmers association is Horta & Arte—the largest supplier of organic vegetables 
in São Paulo. In order for the product to be sold as organic, the farm must undergo a 
certification process, which includes a period of conversion to eliminate chemical residues 
from conventional agriculture. This is the major entry barrier in this market, because during 
this period the farm experiences a drop in production, and the product cannot yet be sold with 
the margin of a differentiated price. This period is rather variable and, depending on the crop 
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to be planted and the history of the area, can take from six months to two years. For tomatoes, 
for example, this period is normally six months. 
Horta & Arte contracts ex-ante the crop variety the quantity and the area to be 
cultivated. After the market sale, the farmer receives payment for the product he delivered, 
but in the case of surplus, the unsold product is discounted proportionally from each farmer 
(REZENDE, 2003, p. 73). Therefore, farmers transfer to the association the right to allocate 
rewards from organic production. The decision rights regarding income flow are allocated to 
the organization at the first stage of production. 
Geographic proximity among organic fresh vegetable farmers is important. Working 
in association, one farmer heavily depends on his neighbor’s strategies and behavior. If one of 
the farmers cheats and uses agrochemicals to increase production or productivity, the whole 
group can lose reputation and price premiums. If irrigation water is contaminated with 
chemical residues from surrounding conventional farms, the whole group of organic farmers 
will lose. Because agronomic research for organic products is still incipient in Brazil, the 
prospect of knowledge sharing among farmers is vital to achieving productivity increases and 
responding to the challenges of crop diseases. Therefore, geographic agglomeration of organic 
producers raises positive network externalities due to lower probability of water and soil 
contamination, development and transmission of agronomic knowledge, and easier cross-
monitoring to avoid opportunistic behavior—cost sub-additivity is present in organic 
production, which explains the advantages of geographic proximity. However, farmers also 
decide to form associations to better explore those network externalities and to avoid risks of 
reputation losses. In other words, farmers have chosen a particular governance structure in 
order to appropriate the positive network externalities, avoiding the negative ones. The 
appropriation of positive network externalities, as well as the exploration of scale and scope 
economies, creates advantages in organic production, even if the price premium declines and 
reaches prices close to those of conventional products, as has occurred in developed countries. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Cases show evidences of two different network governance structures based on the 
existence of network externalities and governance costs of network arrangement. The 
allocation of authority as seen in the IllyCafè case follows the theoretical proposition, while 
the repeated-transactions structure opens room for dynamic elements based on reputation to 
affect the costs of transaction and therefore governance costs. The organic case shows a 
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different design wherein governance costs are placed with farmers, including the allocation of 
production decision rights. The allocation of decision rights to exclude farmers for 
underperformance and price premium are placed at M2, whereas in the Illy case, they are 
placed at M1. Organic farmers show an unexpected tradeoff between lowering price premiums 
and network externalities providing cost advantages.  
The ICT-TCE interface model allows us to form testable hypotheses with regard to 
several strategic decisions: 
- Whether or not incentives exist to make transaction-specific investments depends 
on both price premiums and network externalities. 
- Price premiums are negatively correlated with network externalities and with 
possible dynamic effects from co-specialized assets that cause reductions in governance costs. 
- Even in the absence of price premiums, it is still possible to place incentives at M2 
for specific network arrangements. 
- Governance costs might be counterbalanced by network externalities, and also by 
the evolution of interfirm routines, which affect costs over time.  
Opportunities for empirical analysis reveal good prospects. 
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